

Pandemic planning in Australia and New Zealand



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The Health Systems

- Both countries have a mixed government (public) and non-government (private) funded health systems
- Public health is funded, administered and regulated at at both the national and state or district levels
- The private health system is partially funded and regulated by the national governments
- Disaster response is a shared responsibility of the national, state/regional and district systems

Before 2009

Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza 2006

- Actions are dependent on levels of threat as based on WHO guidelines
- However, there are separate Global and Australian Threat levels with different actions

WHO Phase	Aust Phases	Description of phases
4	Overseas 4	Human infection overseas - small cluster(s), limited human to human transmission, spread highly localised; virus is not well adapted to humans
	Aus 4	Human infection in Australia - small cluster(s), limited human to human transmission, spread highly localised; virus is not well adapted to humans
5	Overseas 5	Human infection overseas - larger cluster(s) but human to human transmission still localised; virus is becoming better adapted to humans (substantial pandemic risk)
	Aus 5	Human infection in Australia larger cluster(s), substantial pandemic risk

The Approach to Pandemic Influenza

- Delay entry of the pandemic strain into Australia
 - Restrict entry for affected areas. Early identification of entry of the pandemic strain through border surveillance and testing. Quarantine of proven/suspect cases. Contact tracing
- Slow spread once it enters
 - Quarantine/isolation of cases. Social distancing. Community hygiene. Antiviral agents for treatment and prophylaxis. Use of vaccines when available.
- Lessen impact
 - Reduce numbers, broaden peak of activity. Optimise care and treatment of cases. Undertake business continuity planning. Enable effective communication. Use antiviral prophylaxis/vaccination for essential workers.

Pandemic Influenza: Government activities

- Establish a structure for national leadership and coordination
- Establish a stockpile of antivirals, personal protective equipment, and other medical supplies
- Enhance surveillance
- Increase laboratory capacity
- Arrange contracts for pandemic vaccine supply
- Accelerate research relevant to pandemic influenza

Testing it out – Exercise Cumpston



- Small outbreak in Acamor and Bellatrix, with rapid international spread.
- Seven infected travellers introduce virus to Australia

Things to fix before the pandemic

1. Re-examine some of the assumptions made about pandemic planning

- Better define the range of scenarios and phases
- Better mathematical models

2. Improve the decision making process

- Too slow for use during a pandemic response.

3. Better decision support

- Better processes to assist decision makers, to inform them about impact, priorities, cost/benefit, levels of uncertainty, legal frameworks for action

4. Better surveillance

- More adaptable, focussed on testing assumptions and interventions

5. Better communications

- within response groups, with the public, with the health care sector

6. Better engagement with primary care


Pandemic plans in the Asia-Pacific

	Nature of plan	Year of publication	English language version available	Reference	Linked documents
Australia	Final	2005	Yes	6	-
Cambodia	None	-	-	-	-
China	Draft	2005	Yes	7	*
Hong Kong (SAR of China)	Final	2005	Yes	9, 10	11
Indonesia	None	-	-	-	-
Laos	None	-	-	-	-
New Zealand	Draft	2005	Yes	12	13
Thailand	Final	2005	Yes	14	15
Vietnam	Final	2005	No	16	17

Coker R, Mounier-Jack S. *Lancet* 2006;368:886-889


Pandemic influenza H1N1 09 in Australia 2009

Figure 2. Influenza activity in Australia, by reporting week, years 2007, 2008 and 2009*



* Data on pandemic (H1N1) 2009 cases is extracted from NetEPI; data on seasonal influenza is extracted from the NNDSS. Sources: NNDSS and NetEPI databases

Australian Influenza Surveillance Report #22:
Commonwealth Dept of Health and Ageing



Post 2009 review lessons identified

Overall Australia and New Zealand did very well, but the health systems were severely stressed.



- Governance and decision making
- Communications
- Surveillance
- Border measures
- Public health measures
- Health sector capacity
- Laboratory capacity
- National Medical Stockpile deployment
- Vaccination
- Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders

Post-pandemic review examples

	Areas for improvement	Planned actions
Governance and decision making	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The plan failed to allow for variable timing of the outbreak across Australia.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Greater flexibility in planning and delivery
Communications	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Different, and sometimes conflicting, information from different official sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Develop a clear communication plan
Surveillance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• No comprehensive approach to collection, analysis and reporting of detailed data about the early cases.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Incorporate a “first few hundred” protocol
Border measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• High resource requirements with minimal benefit.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Review and update protocols for airports and seaports
Public health measures	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Home quarantine difficult to implement, and lack of public understanding of its importance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Review policies on use of antiviral medications, quarantine, isolation, and school closures.

Post-pandemic review examples

	Areas for improvement	Planned actions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Medical Stockpile deployment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Difficult for community practitioners to get PPE supplies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Refine and clarify stockpile requirements, distribution policies and logistics.
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Vaccination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Not possible to produce and deploy a pandemic vaccine until after the first wave of the pandemic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Identify the acceptable risk/benefit criteria for a pandemic vaccine
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The issues specific to Indigenous Australians with underlying medical conditions or living in remote areas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incorporate Indigenous issues into the pandemic planning process.
Health sector capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Limited capacity to enhance the health workforce during a pandemic, especially if there is an expectation that “business as usual” will be maintained 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop a surge capacity strategy
Laboratory capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of clinician acceptance of the requirements to restrict testing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improve communication lines between laboratories, public health and clinical services


Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza 2014 – the enhancements

- Use of existing systems and governance mechanisms, rather than creating new ones for the pandemic
- Take a flexible approach that can be scaled and varied to meet the needs experienced at the time
- Use evidence-based decision making
- Ensure strong linkages with other emergency response arrangements
- The plan can also be applied to seasonal influenza, when it threatens to overwhelm our health systems;
- Clear guidance on the collection of national surveillance data
- Emphasise communications activities as a key tools in the response.

Are we better prepared?

- More practice for major public health threats– pandemic, MERS, Ebola
- Better surveillance systems
- More capacity within hospitals for patient isolation and cohorting, and more high level support for respiratory failure
- Improved interactions with general practitioners and Indigenous populations
- Greater laboratory capacity in the public and private sectors, especially PCR-based testing and high-containment laboratories
- Substantial applied research relevant to pandemic influenza


Community Planning in New Zealand



<http://www.health.govt.nz/publication/new-zealand-influenza-pandemic-plan-framework-action>

Canterbury 2018 Primary Care Flu Response Plan: Seasonal influenza is 'path to readiness'

MODEL: Impact of Annual Winter Illnesses



Canterbury 2018 Primary Care Flu Response Plan

Intelligence



Immunization Strategy




Practice/Pharmacy Preparedness



Hospital and Emergency Dept


Canterbury Influenza Season Triggers and Primary Response Escalation



Escalation of response triggers:

Clinical leaders meet separately to consider Community & Public Health data, incidence, severity and mortality before notifying the Chief Medical Officer (CDHB), and thereby requesting an escalated response.

Decentralised **Community Response Options** Centralised



Business as Usual or Busy Season

- Regular patients (**green**) and ILI patients (**red**) attend at their usual general practice.
- Recommend screening patients to green and red streams.

Sector-based Response

- A practice/premise is established as a Designated Clinic for a small geographic area.
- The Designated Clinic manages its own **green** and **red** stream patients *and* **red** stream patients from other practices.

Centralised Response

- A Designated Clinic(s) established for **all red** stream patients from a larger geographic area, e.g. urban Christchurch.
- **Green** stream patients attend their usual general practice.


The aim is to manage the response so we:

- Go no further to the right than we have to
- For no longer than we have to
- With no more practices than we have to


Summary

- We are better prepared, but much to do
- Pandemic planning should be an ongoing process taking into consideration gaps identified during novel disease events and exercises
- Seasonal influenza outbreaks provide a pathway to “whole of society” readiness

14th Century English proverb



“the real value of something can be judged only from practical experience or results and not from appearance or theory”



A well-controlled pandemic
OR
a bit of a mess?